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THE ECONOMICS OF HOME
PRODUCTION
JONI HERSCH*

The composition of the labor force has changed dramatically
since 1960. In 1960, only one-third of the labor force participants
were female. However, since the 1960s, the labor force rates of men
have declined, from 83.3% to 75% as of 1995, while the participation
rate for women has surged, from 37.7% in 1960 to 58.9% in 1995.1
The combination of rising labor force participation rates for women
and falling rates for men has resulted in a work force that is approaching equal representation of each gender.
However, the picture at home indicates a far greater gender stratification of work than that of the paid labor market. Now as in the
past, the bulk of the goods and services produced at home is provided
by women. Although the time reported varies with the methods used
to measure home production, recent data indicate that married, fulltime employed women spend on average twenty to thirty hours per
week on home production, While married full-time employed men
average seven to fifteen hours per week.
When most married women were not in the labor force it was
easy to understand, with or without resorting to economic theory, that
most home production would be performed by women. But why is
this still the case? And what effect does this "second shift" have on
women's market earnings?
For many women, home production is their primary productive
contribution, and this has important legal implications. For example,
in many divorce cases, the main claim of wives to the assets accumulated during marriage is their contribution to the home. In a highly
publicized pending case, Lorna Wendt argues that her role as a "cor-

porate wife" entitles her to one-half of the $52 - $100 million estate
*

Professor of Economics, Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyo-

ming, Laramie, WY 82071, jhersch@uwyo.edu, 307-766-2178.
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr
at 394 (116th ed. 1996).
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accumulated through the earnings of her husband Gary Wendt in his
paid job as a rising executive and eventually CEO of GE Capital.2
Similarly, in wrongful death cases, the economic loss of a woman's
home services will frequently exceed the earnings loss.
After discussing the magnitude and measurement of home production, I describe the economic theories underlying the allocation of
time within the household, followed by an examination of the effects
of housework on earnings. The two main classes of economic theories, human capital theory and bargaining theory, yield implications
consistent with the observed household allocation of labor: that is,
women assume a greater proportion of home production while men
specialize relatively more in market production. This stratification is
further exacerbated by institutional factors such as the tax code that
effectively discourage second earner employment while exempting
home production from taxation, as noted by McCaffery;3 the paucity
of viable part-time and flextime employment options; and child care
difficulties. Given the large amount of time spent on housework, it is
not entirely surprising that housework time has a negative effect on
market wages, an effect that is most pronounced for wives.
I. MEASUREMENT AND MAGNITUDE OF HOME
PRODUCTION
A.

THRESHOLD PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS

Measuring home production is not an easy task. Goods and services sold in the market can be valued at the price at which they are
sold, and this is the method used in all national income accounting
systems. However, by definition, nonmarket output carries no such
market price. Estimating home production requires measurement of
both time spent on home production and of the rate at which this time
should be valued. Both of these raise difficult conceptual and practical issues.
There are two main uses of estimates of the value of nonmarket
production. One use is to provide better measures of social output
than that provided by conventional national income accounts such as
Gross National Product ("GNP"). The failure to account for the
value of home production can lead to misleading interpretations of
2. See, e.g., Judith H. Dobrzynski, Was It His Career,or Theirs?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,1997,
at D1, D6.
3.

EDWARD J. McCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 19-23 (1997) [hereinafter TAXING WOMEN].
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the growth of the economy or of the standard of living. Indeed, the
magnitude of home production is surprisingly large. For example, Eisner4 estimates the value of home production as one-third of conventionally measured GNP.' The other use for the value of nonmarket
production is within the litigation context in providing value of damages in divorce or wrongful injury or death cases.
In any analysis of time or valuation of home production, it is necessary to distinguish home production from leisure. A number of productive activities have a leisure component to them, such as baking,
gardening or playing with one's children. A way to operationalize the
distinction is to define household production activities as those which
can be done by paying a third party. However, none of the surveys
which elicit time-use information instruct the respondent to make this
distinction. Surveys simply request information on time use, but not
whether the activities were solely for pleasure or production.
The most reliable method of collecting information on time spent
on home production is through time diaries generated by subjects who
recall all activities performed over the preceding twenty-four hour
period, with the information collected by either phone, by personal
interview or by the respondent filling out a diary. Measures of home
production are derived by summing up time spent on activities such as
cooking, cleaning and home maintenance.
Time-use studies using diary information were conducted in the
United States in 1965, 1975, 1981-82, and 1985.6 A conceptual problem with diary data is that much time at home involves joint activities,
such as folding laundry while watching television. An additional problem is that infrequent activities, such as major home repairs, will not
be measured reliably and tend to be underestimated.
The other common way of eliciting information is by simply asking survey respondents how much time they spent on home production in the preceding week or year. Since this is far easier to ask, and
less costly to obtain, this is the measure of housework available in data
sources not specifically designed to measure time use. The data sets
4. Robert Eisner, Extended Accounts for National Income and Product, 26 J. ECON.
LrrE.RATuR 1673 (1988).
5. This estimate uses data from time use surveys to calculate hours of housework per
week by gender and employment status, and evaluates housework time at the wage rate of
domestic workers. See id. at 1673-74.
6. See F. Thomas Juster & Frank P. Stafford, The Allocation of Time: EmpiricalFinds,
Behavior Models, and Problems of Measurement, 29 J. EcoN. LrrmRATUR 471, 473 (1991).
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with this measure of housework have far more observations and richer
information on other work and personal characteristics than data sets
using time diaries. This summary measure tends to provide housework values somewhat larger than diary data, although in most data
sets the discrepancy is not so large as to make the summary measures
unusable for research purposes.7
B.

VALUING

HoME PRODUCION TiMt

Given a measure of time spent on home production, this time
must be valued at some rate. The main methods of evaluating home
production are by replacement cost or by the opportunity cost of the
individual performing the work. Both methods have theoretical merit
depending on the context, and both have substantial problems in
application.
The replacement cost method is most frequently used in litigation
where home production has been lost.8 To evaluate the services of a
homemaker who cooks, cleans house, does laundry and takes care of
children, the replacement cost method would evaluate her time using
the market wage rates of cooks, house cleaners, launderers and nannies, weighted by the amount of time spent on each of these activities.
An obvious difficulty in evaluating nonmarket production by
equivalent market purchased services is that much home production is
done jointly, and much home production is done for brief periods of
time and on an intermittent basis. A typical evening hour of a parent
may include supervising homework while occasionally answering
questions, folding laundry and reading the newspaper during the wash
and dry cycles of the laundry. Purchasing equivalent market services
involves other costs: screening, hiring and supervising the tutor, driving to the laundry or arranging pickup and delivery. In addition, most
services have a minimum price. The tutor will charge by the hour
whether the child needs ten minutes of help or the full hour. Evaluating home production at the market equivalent price leads to measurement errors that both overstate and understate the true value of home
production. The overstatement arises from not accounting for joint
7.

See Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Housework, Fixed Effects, and Wages of Married

Workers, 32 J. HUM. REoScES 285-307 (1997) (comparing housework measures derived in the
1975 Tune Use Survey to that available in summary form on the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics).
8. See Charles C. Fischer, The Valuation of Household Production:Divorce, Wrongful
Injury and Death Litigation, 53 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 187, 190 (1994).
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production; the understatement arises from not taking into account
transaction costs. 9
The opportunity cost method evaluates home production at the
value of the best alternative activity. If the best alternative activity is
working in the market, then the opportunity cost of time on home
production should be measured as the marginal wage rate or by the
predicted wage rate for those out of the labor force. The predicted
wage will be based on individual observable characteristics such as
education, job training and experience. However, the decision to specialize in home production results in a different set of productivity
characteristics than that of someone specializing in the market. The
implied wage for someone who specializes in home production will
therefore typically be lower than if that same person had specialized
in the market. In fact, this is one implication of Wells and Maher's
dynamic bargaining model within households,' ° discussed in the next
section.
C. TIME

AND HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION OF

HoME PRODUCTION

The gender-linked division of time on household tasks is
observed in every data set. Tune diary data from 1975 reported by
Hill" indicates that full-time employed married women average
almost 25 hours per week in home-oriented work, while their male
counterparts average 12.7 hours per week.' 2 Across all marital and
employment statuses, women average nearly 35 hours per week in
home-oriented work while men average 14.25 hours. 3 Juster and
Stafford note that the trend over time in the United States has been a
decline in hours spent on housework for women, from 41.8 hours per
week in 1965 to 30.5 in 1981.'4 Over this period there has been a
9.

One approach to recognizing the value of joint production in the replacement cost

method is to identify the primary task (say supervising homework), value this at the market
wage rate and add a premium for multi-tasking. This corresponds to the wage premium that a

McDonald's shift manager earns over other counter help, even though most of the manager's
time is spent in activities similar to those workers.

10. See generally Robin Wells & Maria Maher, Tme and Surplus Allocation Within Marriage (1996) (paper presented at the 1997 meeting of the American Economic Association)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Southern California Review of Law and Women's
Studies).

11. Martha S. Hill, Patterns of Time Use, in TmE, GOODS, AND WELL-BEING 133, 148
tbl.7.3 (F. Thomas Juster & Frank P. Stafford eds., 1985).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Juster & Stafford, supra note 6, at 471-77 tbl.3.
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slight increase in men's housework time, from 11.5 hours per week to
13.8.'5
The distribution of activities varies greatly by gender as well as by
marital status. South and Spitze' 6 report mean values of time spent in
each of nine household tasks available in the National Survey of Families and Households 1987-88.'7 The total home production time is
consistent with the values derived from time-use diaries. In every
marital status women spend more time on housework than men, with
married women spending over two times that of married men.1
The values indicate that gender stereotypes are based on
observed behavior and are not misleading. For instance, married
women average 10.14 hours per week preparing meals and 0.16 hours
on car maintenance, while married men average 2.69 hours and 1.37
for meals and car maintenance respectively. 19 This type of specialization by gender within married households is predicted by the models
discussed in the next section.
More noteworthy is that the gender patterns of behavior are
observed for not-married individuals as well, with never-married,
divorced and widowed women consistently spending far more time on
traditional "female" tasks such as preparing meals, cleaning and laundry. Representative values reported in South and Spitze for the total
time spent on meal preparation, washing dishes, cleaning house and
washing and ironing for never-married women and men living independently are 19 hours per week for women and 12.7 hours per week
for men.20
The division of time on home production between married
couples is provided in Hersch and Stratton.2 ' Once again we see a
clear gender pattern to time spent on household activities that is consistent with gender specialization and serves to confirm stereotyping
of household activities. The share of total household time done by
15. See id.
16. Scott J. South & Glenna Spitze, Housework in Maritaland NonmaritalHouseholds,59
AM. Soc. RFv. 327, 341 tbl.3 (1994).

17. These are self-reported, non-diary values of time use.
18. See South & Spitze, supra note 16.
19. See id.
20.

Id. at 341 tbl.3.

21. Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Household Specialization and the Male Marriage
Wage Premium (June 1997) (paper presented at the 1997 meeting of the American Economic
Association) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Southern CaliforniaReview of Law and
Women's Studies).
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wives is 78% of the meal preparation, 75% of the dish washing and
after-meal cleanup, 80% of house cleaning, 70% of household shopping and 86% of the laundry.22 In contrast, husbands do the far larger
share of the total household time on auto maintenance (95%) and
outdoor work and home maintenance (77%). 23 Time spent within the
household on bill paying and driving other household members is
shared more evenly, with wives responsible for 55% of the total
household bill paying time and 40% of the time spent driving other
household members. 24
D.

EVIDENCE FROM OTBER COUNTRIES

An examination of time allocation in other countries reveals patterns similar to those observed in the United States. A systematic initiative to collect time-use data in a number of countries began in the
1960s, and data on time allocation has continued to be collected in a
number of countries every five to ten years. Juster and Stafford survey evidence on time allocation for several countries. Their data
reveal that total average work time (market plus nonmarket work) is
similar for men and women within industrialized countries, with
women averaging higher total work time than men in relatively low
income countries, such as Hungary and Finland. 5 In higher income
countries, such as the United States and Sweden, men have slightly
higher total work time than women.26 However, the gap in total time
by gender within industrialized countries is fairly small-ranging from
3.4 more hours on average per week for men in the United States to
5.2 more hours on average for women in Hungary. 27

The time spent by women on housework (defined here as routine
chores, home projects and child care) is fairly similar across industrialized countries, ranging from 27 hours per week (USSR) to 33.8 hours
per week (Hungary).28 Time spent by men on housework varies considerably more, from 3.5 hours per week in Japan to 18.1 hours per
week in Sweden.29
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id at tbl3.
See id.
See id
Juster & Stafford, supra note 6, at 475 tbl.1.
See id
See id
See id
See id.
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II. THEORIES OF HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION
A.

INDIVIDUAL

DECISION-MiAKING

AND

HUMAN CAPITAL

THEORY

Economists use the framework of utility maximization to explain
consumption and time allocation decisions. In its most basic form,

individuals maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, where utility depends on market goods and leisure time. The budget constraint
gives the total income available to the individual to allocate among
market goods and services and is determined by the individual's
choice of hours to work for pay in the labor market as well as by the
amount of non-labor income available.
Even in this most rudimentary form, this basic framework is useful in explaining many observed patterns of behavior. Of relevance to
the household time allocation decision is whether an individual
chooses to invest relatively more in market skills or in the non-market
sector. For example, attending law school, medical school or getting a
Ph.D. is a highly time-consuming process with a high opportunity cost
(measured by the forgone earnings while in school). Individuals
choose to invest in education and job training in order to maximize
the net present value of utility (or earnings) over their lifetimes.
These decisions are based on the cost of acquiring such skills and on
the expected return derived from possession of such skills. Thus, individuals expecting a greater market working life will have a greater
incentive to invest in market-related education and job training.
Individuals investing in larger amounts of skills raise their market
earnings over time as well as their opportunity costs of time not spent
in the market. More time devoted to market work yields higher market earnings and allows greater consumption of market goods.
Applied to the individual, this time allocation decision is easily made
according to the principle of utility maximization: individuals choose
the time allocation (and investment path) which yields the greatest
amount of satisfaction.
B.

HOUSEHOLD DECISION-MAKING AND BARGAINING THEORY

But most of us spend most of our life in a family. We are born
into a family, share companionship, marry, sometimes divorce, and
have children in a household. Taking the narrow view of an economist, living with others opens up a number of opportunities unavailable to individuals, by allowing new opportunities for specialization
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and exchange which will lead to greater output than the sum of individual production. By allowing household members to spend more
time in activities at which they are relatively more efficient, more can
be produced within the household. Members of households may also
produce "public goods" which can be shared by all without reducing
individual consumption. The household public goods and the surplus
generated by specialization and exchange can then be shared by the
household. So far there is nothing controversial: any system of specialization and exchange will yield a greater surplus than a self-sufficient "Robinson Crusoe" type of economy in which each individual
produces what he or she consumes.
The issue of efficiency addresses the household allocation which
yields the biggest household surplus. However, the distribution of this
surplus among the members of the household is an entirely different
matter. The early models of the household assume that households
maximize a common utility function and thus have ignored issues of
distribution. Samuelson's consensus model 30 assumes there is a family
utility function which all members of the household maximize subject
to a budget constraint derived from pooling individual incomes.
Becker's model assumes an altruistic head of household whose utility
function includes the consumption and welfare of other family members. 1 By altering transfers to individual household members, this
altruistic head can induce the other members of the household to act
in a way to maximize family income.
Neither of these models are equipped to address issues of distribution. Both the consensus model and the altruistic model assume
that family members pool their incomes, and that any increase in
income affects total household demands. However, these models
make no predictions regarding the distribution within the household.
Yet, common sense, as well as the prevalence of divorce, suggest that
individuals within the household may well differ in their preferences,
and who has control over the resources may affect the intrahousehold
allocation.
Bargaining models of marriage have been developed to examine
how decisions are made within the household. These fall into two
classes: cooperative models and noncooperative. In the cooperative

30.
31.

See Paul A. Samuelson, Social Indifference Curves, 70 Q.J. EcoN. 1-22 (1956).
See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 277-306 (enlarged ed. 1991).
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Nash bargaining models of Manser and Brown3 2 and McElroy and

Homey,33 both the husband and wife have utility functions that
depend on their own consumption of private goods as well as on
household public goods. If the couple does not reach agreement
about the distribution of goods within the household, they divorce. If
they divorce, each spouse receives the utility associated with divorce,
which is referred to as their "threat point." The partner who will have
the higher utility if divorced will have a greater influence on the distribution within the family.
Social changes which affect the utility of being single, such as the
likelihood of remarriage, the social acceptability of remaining unmarried and laws affecting the division of marital property and child custody affect the threat point, even without any change in the household
income. However, changes in household income will not necessarily
have an affect on individual utility unless this changes the threat point
from being divorced. If the household is, for instance, receiving food
stamps or other welfare assistance, the allocation within the household would not differ, whether the nominal recipient is the husband or
the wife.
Lundberg and Pollak propose a "separate spheres" bargaining
model that differs from the divorce threat model in that the threat
point is not divorce but instead is a non-cooperative marriage.34 As in
the divorce threat model, utility for each spouse depends on his or her
own private consumption as well as on his or her consumption of the
public goods produced in the marriage. Each spouse maximizes utility
taking as given the other spouse's strategy. With both spouses producing both private goods and household public goods, the noncooperative equilibrium leads to a lower output of public goods than if
the spouses cooperated. The separate spheres model also differs from
the divorce threat model in that it predicts the threat point within
marriage will be altered by a change in the control of resources. For
instance, food stamps or welfare payments paid to the mother will
result in a stronger position for the mother.

32. See generally Marilyn Manser & Murray Brown, Marriage and Household DecisionMaking: A BargainingAnalysis, 21 INT'L EcoN. R y. 31-44 (1980).

33. See generally Marjorie B. McElroy & Mary Jean Homey, Nash-BargainedHousehold
Decisions: Toward A Generalization of the Theory of Demand, 22 INT'L EcoN. Rav. 333-49
(1981).
34.

Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Separate Spheres Bargainingand the Marriage

Market, 101 J.PoL. ECON. 988, 988 (1993).
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The Manser and Brown, McElroy and Homey, and Lundberg
and Pollak models are one-period models. In contrast, Wells and
Maher35 develop a non-cooperative dynamic model in which partners
choose between allocating time to household public goods production
or career activities, and both activities exhibit learning effects (as in
Becker's model). Thus, a wife who specializes in home production
relatively more than her husband will lose the wage growth accruing
to greater career activities. This results in a weaker bargaining position within the household since her alternative opportunities are correspondingly weaker. Although the efficient outcome is complete
specialization within marriage, the non-contractibility of money transfers leads to inefficient incomplete specialization.
C.

GENDER SPECIALIZATION

Each of these models (except for Samuelson's consensus model)
implies a division of labor within the household by gender, but for
different reasons. Becker's altruism model is consistent with human
capital theory, which predicts that one member of a household will
specialize relatively more in market work while the other will specialize relatively more in home production.3 6 Increasing returns to specialization resulting from learning effects leads to even greater
efficiency gains by ever more complete specialization. This efficiency
proposal alone does not imply that women will specialize in home production. However, many proponents of this theory argue that there
are natural or innate differences by gender in comparative or absolute
advantage that result in such gender specialization.3 7 Even if the hus-

band and wife have equal market ability, men are unable to bear children. Women, therefore, have an absolute advantage in childbearing,
leading to the development of different skills. Thus the wedge created
by the time required for childbearing, no matter how short, makes it
optimal for women to specialize in home production and for men to
specialize in market work. This absolute advantage in childbearing
compounded with other maintained biological differences (such as
"nurturing instincts") provides an economic rationale for the observed
gender-linked division of labor within the household.
In the divorce threat bargaining models, the threat point determines the relative bargaining position. If housework is undesirable,
35. Wells & Maher, supra note 10, at 3-4.
36.
37.

See BECKER, supra note 31, at 277-306.
See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON TiE FAMILY 37-38 (1981).

432

REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES

[Vol. 6:421

the spouse with the lower threat point will perform a greater share
within the household. Thus, the higher wage earner-typically the
husband-will have a stronger bargaining position, because upon
divorce he will be better able to purchase market substitutes (such as
housekeepers or restaurant meals) for many of the services once provided by his wife. This inequity in earnings may then lead to the
observed gender-linked division of household work.
The separate spheres model implies specialization in the household public good by gender as a means of reducing transactions costs.
If the couple isn't cooperating, trying to reach an agreement on which
public goods each spouse should provide is not likely to be resolved
easily. Therefore the default option of performing the gender-stereotypical household responsibilities reduces the costs of coordination.
The dynamic noncooperative model implies that any disparity in
wages by gender, with women earning less than men, results in wives
producing a larger share of the household public good, while husbands
specialize relatively more in their careers. Indeed, the disparity
between home production performed by each spouse will be greater
than the disparity in current relative wages due to the feedback mechanism in which more time in the market yields greater wage growth in
future wages.
Thus economic theory provides firm support of the optimality of
the observed gender-based division of labor. The other observed
labor market differences easily follow given this gender-based division
of labor. Women specializing in home production will anticipate
fewer total years in the labor market and will optimally make lesser
investments in human capital and job skills than men. Firms may
invest less in job training of female workers (although the evidence on
that based on recent data is inconclusive).
But keep in mind that the household decision resulting in the wife
specializing in home production, while optimal for the household from
an efficiency standpoint, may hurt her labor market options forever,
via both the indirect effect on her skill accumulation and the direct
effect of household responsibilities on wages. Her relatively weaker
market power may further weaken any bargaining power she may
possess to make the time allocation decision more equitable.
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D. TAx POLICY

AND ALLOCATION OF HOUSEWORK

TIME

Economic optimization implies that people reallocate their budgets in response to relative price changes. If the price of orange juice
goes down relative to apple juice, consumers will buy more orange
juice. By changing relative prices, the tax rate has a similar impact on
the time allocation decision. Higher tax rates lower the value of one's
own time relative to that of the market-purchased substitute. That is,
someone with after-tax income of $20 per hour is more likely to pay
$10 per hour for a housekeeper than someone with after-tax earnings
of $10 per hour.
Taxation may potentially play an important role in the allocation
of housework time between spouses. The U.S. system of jointly taxing
the household earnings of married couples results in a high effective
tax rate of the second earner. If women are viewed as the marginal
worker, as argued by McCaffery,3 s under current tax policy any gap in
hourly wages will be greater when measured by after-tax rather than
pre-tax earnings.
Although the effect of after-tax earnings on household time allocation has not been examined, the gender allocation may be exacerbated by the tax structure. 39 Evidence consistent with this hypothesis
is provided by the examples of Norway and Sweden. In these countries, the tax rates are highly progressive, and individual earnings are
taxed at individual marginal tax rates. This results in after-tax earnings that are more equal by gender than before-tax earnings, and the
gap in time spent on home production by gender is also narrower than
in the United States. 40 Note that the tax policy and gender equalization relation is not uniform across countries. For instance, the USSR
had low tax rates but highly disparate levels of home production by
gender.4 '
The tax implications of the divorce threat model may also influence distribution. As McElroy and Homey point out, their bargaining
framework allows an examination of the effect of the "marriage tax"
on household labor supply.42 Family expenditure decisions will be
based on the wife's after-tax marginal wage rate, while the wife's
38. TAxiNG WOMEN, supra note 3, at 15.

39. Note, however, that the marginal tax rate is determined endogenously by the labor
supply decisions of the household.
40.

See Juster & Stafford, supra note 6, at 510.

41. See id.
42.

McElroy & Homey, supra note 33, at 346.

434

REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES

[Vol. 6:421

threat point is determined by her after-tax marginal wage rate if not
married.4 3
III. HOUSEWORK AND WAGES
It has long been recognized that household responsibilities may
affect women's earnings through their effect on human capital
accumulation. Many observers have also suggested that the magnitude of time spent on home production by women may have an additional, more direct effect on wages.4" This seems quite reasonable: if
any full-time worker took a second job averaging thirty hours a week,
we would not be surprised to see the worker's productivity suffering.
Indeed, the empirical evidence confirms that, for women, there is an
inverse relation between time on housework and wages. 45
However, the mechanism by which housework affects wages is
less clear. Yet it is vital to understand the source of any relation
before considering any possible policy intervention. There are at least
six possible mechanisms which may cause a negative housework
effect, described below.
(1) Housework may not affect earnings at all, but individuals who
spend more time on housework are innately less productive in the
market. If so, the wage-housework relation is spurious and due to
individual but unobservable fixed characteristics negatively correlated
with wages and positively correlated with housework.
(2) Household responsibilities have a negative effect on market
earnings by reducing the amount of effort available for market work.
The model proposed by Gary Becker4 6 assumes that physical effort is
43. See id
44. This point has been made by a wide range of economists, including VICrOR R. FUCHS,
WOMEN'S QuEsr FOR ECONOMIC EQUALrrTY 4,43,58-74 (1988); WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK:
SEx SEGREGATION ON T
JOB (Barbara Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986); Gary S.
Becker, Human Capita4 Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. ECON. S33-S35

(1985); and Walter Y. Oi, On Working, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 8,24 (1993), as well as by numerous
journalists.
45. See Shelly Coverman, Gender,Domestic Labor Time, and Wage Inequality, 48 AM. Soc.
REv. 623, 630 (1983); Joni Hersch, The Impact of Nonmarket Work on Market Wages, 81 AM.
EcoN. Ass'N PAPERS AND PROC. 157-60 (1991) [hereinafter Hersch, Nonmarket Work]; Joni
Hersch, Male-Female Differences in Hourly Wages: The Role of Human Capital,Working Conditions, and Housework, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 746-59 (1991) [hereinafter Hersch, Human
Capital];Hersch & Stratton, supranote 7; Beth Anne Shelton & Juanita Firestone, An Examination of Household Labor Time as a Factor in Composition and Treatment Effects on the MaleFemale Wage Gap, 21 Soc. Focus 265-78 (1988).
46. BECKER, supra note 31, at 545.

1997]

THE ECONOMICS OF HOME PRODUCTION

in limited supply. Individuals must allocate this limited effort across
different activities. The more effort that is expended upon housework, the less effort will be available on the job and, consequently,
wages will be lower. Since effort is difficult to measure directly,
housework time may serve as a proxy. If so, controlling for effort on
the job should eliminate the observed relation between housework
and wages.
(3) Time spent on housework may be a proxy for unobserved
human capital. Specialization leads to differences in human capital
investments stich as education and training. Although wage equations
include information on observable and measurable determinants of
wages, variables such as education and experience may represent different magnitudes of market human capital for workers primarily specializing in home production rather than in the labor market.
Housework time, in this case, would represent a measure of human
capital not otherwise included.
(4) Housework responsibilities do not directly reduce earnings,
but individuals with heavy household responsibilities seek jobs compatible with such responsibilities. Jobs with flexible scheduling, which
do not require overtime or allow workers to phone home or run
errands during work hours, offer other benefits that may offset lower
pay. Conversely, jobs that are risky, unpleasant or have mandatory
overtime or require long hours (such as the law profession) warrant
higher wages. Wage tradeoffs for working conditions are called compensating wage differentials. Housework time may be correlated with
unobserved working conditions that warrant compensating differentials that on average favor men. Jobs compatible with household
responsibilities held primarily by women may also be jobs with lower
promotion and wage growth prospects.
(5) Housework may not directly affect wages by any of the earlier
mechanisms, but the person primarily responsible for home production may also be responsible for other household-related chores such
as arranging for and waiting for the plumber, picking up the dry cleaning, shopping for children's holiday gifts for teachers and picking up
children at day care before closing time. This may mean that the work
day is disrupted by phone calls or that the worker must stop work at a
predetermined time no matter how productive they may be at that
moment. This mechanism means that the timing of housework affects
productivity by impinging on market time.
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(6) Discrimination: Firms may simply view workers who demonstrate their involvement with their home and family as less desirable
workers. This may be a very perverse form of discrimination, in that
fathers who are very involved with raising their children are admired
but mothers are frequently perceived as less serious about their
careers.
Before examining the empirical evidence regarding each of these
mechanisms, it is worth exploring what gender differences in housework effects tell us about the underlying mechanism. If the effect of
housework on wages is similar for both men and women, then the
effect may be direct. That is, housework genuinely reduces wages by
lowering productivity in some fashion. If so, then inclusion of time
spent on housework in wage equations should explain more of the
gender wage disparity since women do more housework.
But if only women's wages are affected by housework, then
housework may affect wages only after exceeding some minimum
level (threshold effects) or the relation may not be direct but instead
due to possible discrimination by employers. For instance, women
with heavy household responsibilities may be placed on a "mommy
track," and incur lower wage growth and weaker promotion prospects.
Finally, if the negative housework effect disappears when controlling for individual specific characteristics, this suggests that the gender
difference in wages is due to gender differences in unmeasured individual characteristics.
A.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HOUSEWORK AND WAGES

The first issue to resolve is whether the negative housework effect
is spurious and caused by the correlation of housework time with
unobserved individual characteristics that would lead to lower wages,
even if the individual did no housework. There are two empirical
approaches that correct for this type of bias: instrumental variables
estimators

and

fixed

effects

estimators.

Using

both

of these

approaches, Leslie Stratton and I find that this type of bias is not
responsible for the negative housework effect for women, although
the evidence for men is inconclusive.4 7 The results indicate that, in
estimates that do not control for individual fixed effects or the joint
endogeneity of housework and wages, the negative housework effect
47.

See Herseh & Stratton, supra note 7, at 291-300; see also Hersch, Nonmarket Work,

supra note 45, at 159.
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is present for both men and women. The magnitude of the effect for
wives is twice that for husbands and the difference is statistically significant. In the instrumental variables estimates and the fixed effects
estimates, the housework effect remains negative for wives, but with a
smaller magnitude. In these corrected results, housework does not
have a significant effect on men's wages; however, since men's housework time varies little over time, these estimates may be biased
toward zero.
One possible explanation for the difference in the effect by gender may be that there are threshold effects, in that the negative housework effect only kicks in after some minimal time is spent on
housework. However, this premise is not supported by the data. In
addition, the results are not affected by whether workers are
employed full-time or part-time. These two findings suggest that
housework affecting wages by impinging on market time is unlikely to
be an important source of the wage-housework effect, but further
research is necessary.
The addition of housework time to the wage equation increases
the explanatory power of observable characteristics from between
27% and 30% to 38%.48 Lowering women's housework time to the
male average would increase women's wages by the same magnitude
as raising women's average tenure to men's.
To examine the compensating differentials hypothesis as an
explanation of the housework effect, I collected data from workers on
a wide range of working conditions as well as on housework time, distinguishing in the survey between housework time on days working
versus time spent on days not at work. I found that housework on job
days has a negative effect on wages for women. 49 However, compensating differentials for work characteristics explain only a minor portion of the wage gap. Although the characteristics of jobs primarily
held by men or by women are quite different, there is only limited
evidence that working conditions other than job risk warrant compensating differentials.
Empirical evidence testing the effort theories and unobserved
human capital theories are more preliminary, but suggest that neither

48. See Hersch & Stratton, supra note 7, at 300-01.
49. Hersch, Human Capital,supra note 45, at 753 tbl.2.
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of these hypotheses are the driving force behind the negative housework wage effect observed for women. In Hersch and Stratton5 0 we
examine these two hypotheses. If the effort story is true, then only
current housework time should have an impact on current earnings
and previous housework time should not be significant. Further, if a
direct measure of effort is included in the estimation, housework time
should no longer be significant. If housework time is a proxy for
unobserved human capital, then accumulated housework time will be
important.
A difficult problem to overcome is that effort is unobservable and
proxies will typically be weak. In an-attempt to elicit a measure of
effort, I requested survey respondents to indicate on a zero-to-ten
scale their effort on their job and on housework, using a similar scale
to indicate effort expended watching television in order to scale
responses. Using these data, as well as data from a national panel
survey, we found that only current housework is significant, and that
cumulative housework does not affect wages. This indicates that the
hypothesis that housework is a proxy for unobserved human capital is
unlikely to be true. The measured index of job effort is positively
related to earnings, which suggests that it is a reasonable measure.
However, including effort in the wage equation does not alter the negative effect of housework on wages.

B.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HOUSEHOLD ALLOCAT[ON

Given the observation that women do more housework than men
within the house, is the household allocation of time consistent with

human capital theory or with bargaining theory? In Hersch and Stratton we find evidence that the allocation is consistent with both theo-

ries, although more research is needed to distinguish between the
human capital theories as well as among the different bargaining
51
theories.
We find that the husband's share of housework is significantly
lower when he contributes a greater share of the household's income.
This is predicted by human capital theory, since the higher earning
50. Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, How Housework Lowers Women's Wages: Unobserved Human Capital and Job Effort (1994) (paper presented at the 1994 meeting of the Western Economic Association) (unpublished manuscript on file with Southern CaliforniaReview of
Law and Women's Studies).

51. See Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Housework, Wages, and the Division of Housework Time for Employed Spouses, 84 AM. EcoN. Ass'N PAPERS AND PRoc. 120 (1994).
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spouse has the higher opportunity cost of time. This result is also predicted by the divorce threat bargaining model, since the higher earning spouse will have the higher threat point.
Housework time of both spouses is inversely related to combined
labor income. However, increases in combined income reduce the
husband's time proportionately more than his wife's. There is also an
inverse relation between own housework time and own labor market
hours. Women whose husbands work more hours spend more time on
housework. But this effect is not symmetric: an increase in the wife's
market hours does not affect her husband's housework time.
IV. CONCLUSION
Home production is an important component of society's output.
For many women, home production represents their main contribution to the household and therefore their main claim to assets accumulated during marriage. Home production also serves as the basis for
compensating survivors for a woman's wrongful death.
Both human capital and bargaining models imply that the
observed allocation of housework along gender lines is efficient. It is
likewise efficient for the household member specializing in home production to invest in lesser amounts of human capital. Lower levels of
education and training result in lower wages. Housework also appears
to have a direct negative effect on wages in addition to the effect on
human capital accumulation.
The specialization in home production by gender may relate to
the male marital wage premium. Lorna Wendt claims that her husband's career was successful because she contributed to their two person career as the "corporate wife," by entertaining colleagues, as well
as by assuming all responsibility for raising the children and managing
the household.52 While the Wendt situation is unusual because of the
size of the estate, the arguments raised are not. There is strong evidence indicating that married men earn more on average than comparable single men.53 There is no consistent evidence of a marital wage
differential among women in either direction. Women are neither
rewarded nor penalized directly for being married. Might the male
52. See Dobrzynski, supra note 2.
53. See, e.g., Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Does MarriageReally Make Men More
Productive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 284-87 (1991); Eng Seng Loh, Productivity Differences and

the MarriageWage Premium for White Males, 31 J. HUM.
Stratton, supra note 21, at 1.
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marital premium be due to the within-household allocation between
the husband and wife? Specialization within the household may allow
married men to expend more effort in market production or to otherwise increase their productivity in this sector.
More work needs to be done to examine why we observe a negative housework effect that affects women's wages more than men's. Is
it due to discrimination? Is it due to data problems? Are there genuine productivity differences by gender, and if so, what are these differences? Are the productivity differences due to institutional
constraints, such as limited and poorly paid part time options? Can
the labor market be restructured to eliminate either the productivity
differences or the gender difference in the productivity difference?
Can the tax system be restructured to change incentives to purchase
market substitutes for home production, thereby minimizing the direct
housework effect?

THE INCOME TAX

